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ABSTRACT 
PROFESSIONS educational programs result from AND THEIR FORMAL 
the interaction of social, cultural, and institutional factors. The 
current interplay of economic, technological, social, and cultural 
factors may support the establishment of formal educational programs 
for competitive intelligence professionals. However, due to the hybrid 
nature of the intelligence profession, the established disciplines may 
not provide the most appropriate environment in which these 
programs can flourish. To appreciate its distinctive characteristics, 
a definition of the intelligence function, as well as a description of 
the required competencies, is presented. 
INTRODUCTION 
The demand for intelligence professionals is rising as for-profit 
and not-for-profit firms recognize the need to formalize their 
intelligence activities (Prior, 1993). This increased awareness stems 
from the competitive pressures of the global marketplace as well as 
the favorable impacts of intelligence activities upon corporate 
revenues (Kelly, 1993). However, American colleges and universities 
place a low priority on educating competitor intelligence pro- 
fessionals. A small private college school offers a four-year program 
for the training of intelligence analysts, and a few colleges provide 
a single course in intelligence (Wreden, 1994). Regrettably, although 
the government supports two intelligence programs, only federal 
employees are permitted to enroll (Herring & DeGenaro, 1994). In 
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addition, various professional associations occasionally offer seminars 
and workshops. If an apparent need for trained intelligence workers 
exists, why do American universities virtually ignore this profession? 
The answers to this question are complex and varied. This 
discussion addresses the possible causes for this dilemma. To frame 
these comments, the definition of the intelligence process as well 
as a description of the required competencies needs to be clarified. 
THEINTELLIGENCE DEFINEDFUNCTION 
The intelligence function comprises the collection, analysis, and 
dissemination of information to decision makers and/or strategists 
about events in a company’s external environment (Aguilar, 1967; 
Porter, 1980). Each organization implements the function differently, 
with specific components being assigned to individual members of 
a large intelligence team or with the entire function either being 
outsourced to a research firm or to a single individual. In some settings, 
specific components are inappropriate. The reasons for this variance 
are addressed later in this discussion. 
Where the organization positions the function within the 
decision-making process of ten determines its focus and, therefore, 
its nomenclature. Strategic intelligence emphasizes its relationship 
to strategy formulation. Business intelligence stresses the detection 
of a wide range of movements throughout the company’s external 
environment as well as the dissemination of the identified oppor- 
tunities or threats to decision makers (Stanat, 1990; Hohhof, 1993). 
Competitive intelligence focuses on the present and potential 
strengths, weaknesses, and activities of the firms within a specific 
industry whose products or services closely resemble those of the 
company initiating the search (Porter, 1980). Competitor intelligence 
emphasizes the acquisition of detailed and current information re- 
garding a specific corporation (Fuld, 1985). Although each term shifts 
the focus, the typical process contains the central components of 
collection, analysis, and dissemination of information to decision 
makers. 
Another reason for this terminological jockeying has its basis 
in history. The military initiated intelligence activity for procuring 
highly sensitive information to conduct war effectively. Probably some 
military intelligence was espionage-that is, the process of using 
illegal and unethical means (e.g., stealing) to obtain information. 
Therefore, many Americans of ten confuse intelligence with espionage 
(Martin & Stedman, 1991). Consequently, not wanting to tarnish the 
corporate image in the minds of its stakeholders and investors, 
executives refer to this function discretely. Using the phrase “business 
intelligence” sounds less invasive than strategic or competitive 
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intelligence. Undoubtedly, many intelligence professionals glean 
considerable insights through ethical means. However, recent surveys 
of business practitioners revealed that a substantial number would 
manipulate competitor employees or misrepresent themselves to 
competitors’ vendors, suppliers, or distributors (Schultz et al., 1994). 
Not surprisingly, executives have recently expressed concern over the 
growing frequency of unethical procedures in companies’ conduct 
of competitive analysis (Zahra, 1994). Furthermore, the press 
frequently exposes those American firms that conduct industrial and 
corporate espionage. Consequently, such corrupt practices reinforce 
rather than dissolve the misinterpretation of intelligence as espionage. 
The similarities between the intelligence function and market 
research also contribute to this terminological blur. Traditionally, 
market researchers determine the potential or present market for a 
specific product or service offering. Intelligence professionals also 
examine economic and/or technological trends for potential impacts 
on current product lines as well as for significant opportunities or 
threats to the strategic focus on the entire firm (Smith et al., 1992). 
Due to this subtle, yet important, distinction, many business executives 
dismiss the intelligence function as a mere trend, while other admini- 
strators, who suspect that intelligence work can provide a competitive 
advantage for a firm, assign the function to their market research 
department. However, due to its customary research focus, the staff 
may overlook trends occurring within those sectors of the business 
environment that are unrelated to product and/or service issues. 
In summary, these terminological differences relating to the 
intelligence profession promote a misunderstanding which, in turn, 
undermines its adoption and growth. Later in this discussion, various 
steps will be suggested to alleviate these misconceptions. Before 
describing the components of the intelligence function, the concept 
of the external environment must be clarified to fully appreciate the 
breadth of this activity. 
A company’s external environment can be defined as the relevant 
physical and social factors outside the boundary of an organization 
that are taken into consideration during organizational decision mak- 
ing (Duncan, 1972). Also, the external environment can be con- 
ceptualized as consisting of two layers (Bourgeois, 1980; Dill, 1958). 
The layer closest to the organization is the task environment whose 
sectors of competitors, suppliers, and customers have direct trans- 
actions with the organization. The outer layer is the general environ- 
ment that includes the governmental, economic, and sociotechnical 
sectors with which the organization may have a comparatively indirect 
relationship. Assigning these specific sectors to either the task or 
general environment depends upon how executives choose to define 
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and interact with the entire environment. For example, for an 
electrical engineering firm, the task environment may consist of the 
customers, suppliers, competitors, and technology sectors. For a 
cardboard-box manufacturer, its task environment may only consist 
of the customers, suppliers, and competitors since the technology 
sector displays minimal fluctuations. Sectoring the environment 
enables intelligence personnel as well as decision makers to gather 
specific information more effectively and efficiently. 
BASICCOMPONENTS FUNCTIONOF THE INTELLIGENCE 
The basic components of the intelligence function consist of 
the collection, analysis, and dissemination of information to decision 
makers (Prescott, 1989; McGonagle & Vella, 1990). During the col- 
lection phase, intelligence professionals acquire relevant information 
from primary and secondary sources as well as through direct 
observation (Powell, 1992). Primary sources may be industry experts 
(e.g., analysts, consultants), as well as customers, suppliers, and key 
staff members within such departments as corporate communications, 
investor relations, and public relations. The research techniques used 
for gathering these data include telephone or person-to-person 
interviews, surveys, and focus groups. These sources and techniques 
provide a proprietary information product, which corporate directors 
regard quite highly. 
Secondary sources include a wide variety of databases and print 
publications, such as analysts’ reports, government publications, and 
industry newsletters. Because intelligence professionals must rely on 
materials of high quality and credibility, they seek not only to confirm 
the accuracy of the data, but also to identify the sources which an 
editor has used. Professionals can then recognize possible gaps in 
the information and resolve discrepancies in the data. To augment 
the secondary sources, intelligence professionals of ten contact writers 
for additional insights which they obtained while preparing the 
article. However, unlike primary materials, secondary sources are non- 
proprietary and are available to competitors. Therefore, managers 
perceive secondary data as being incapable of offering strategic 
insights. Therefore, intelligence professionals must add value by 
identifying unique patterns within the data. 
In addition to primary and secondary sources, intelligence 
professionals also acquire beneficial insights through unobtrusive 
observations as well as from other staff members. For example, by 
inspecting the number of vehicles in a corporate parking lot as well 
as the volume of boxes delivered to a retail outlet by a competitor, 
valuable indicators of the growth or decline of a competitor may 
surface. Also, many staff members become aware of events and actions 
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in the external environment which should reach decision makers. 
Sales representatives can provide important comments from their 
customers, and other staff can contribute comments from suppliers 
and other contacts. However, unless channeled to the appropriate 
decision makers, such valuable information becomes lost in the rumor 
mill. Therefore, intelligence professionals can collaborate with 
members of the systems department to develop and install a computer- 
based intelligence system for capturing and communicating this 
information on a consistent basis with minimal effort (Hohhof, 1993). 
This system complements the previously mentioned methods of 
collecting information. 
Having gathered the necessary information, intelligence 
professionals must then determine the trends, issues, opportunities, 
threats, and strategic forces emerging in the data. The analysis phase 
often requires practitioners to approach the data from a frame of 
reference similar to hypothesis testing. Having created a tentative 
proposition, professionals evaluate the data to determine the validity 
of their assumptions as well as the probability of the forthcoming 
and/or current impacts. Most of ten, these research questions focus 
upon specific developments within industries-e.g., new product 
trends within either the mainframe sector of the computer industry 
or the frozen soup sector of the prepared foods industry. The analysis 
may involve the use of statistical programs and various modeling 
techniques. Furthermore, the practitioner may realize the need to 
acquire additional data; therefore, collection and analysis are not 
necessarily sequential stages. Although persistence and creativity are 
necessary throughout this phase, professionals must also recognize 
the point at which further analysis would prove futile. 
Professionals do not create reports within a vacuum. Therefore, 
for the analyses to be useful, i t  is necessary to understand the political 
and power structures that characterize decision-making processes. For 
example, some organizations tolerate creative and challenging 
analyses that question the established posture and attitude as well 
as offer alternatives, while others only permit analyses to confirm 
decisions that have already been made. What information and data- 
gathering techniques can be used, as well as how the data can be 
interpreted, are determined through an understanding of the function 
of analyses within the decision-making process (Bate, 1984; White, 
1986; Lenz & Engledow, 1986). Regrettably, few American firms 
support the critical analysis and evaluation of their corporate strategy 
and marketing position (Martin & Stedman, 1991). Therefore, the 
potential for generating creative and challenging records is greater 
within independent research firms than within many American 
corporations. 
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The final phase of the intelligence function consists of effectively 
communicating the analysis. Understanding how decision makers 
want the information to be presented furthers the credibility as well 
as the use of the report. Decision makers may prefer formal research 
reports, brief outlines of the essential facts, or both. Regardless, 
executives favor charts and other visuals because they often prefer 
succinct graphic displays rather than extensive prose. In addition, 
clients may require intelligence professionals to deliver a verbal 
presentation of their findings, thus, providing an opportunity for 
further clarification of the issues. Therefore, effective communication, 
including written and verbal clarity as well as an extensive use of 
graphics, greatly determines the extent to which decision makers 
consider the contents of the report. 
COMPETENCIES PROFESSIONALSFOR INTELLIGENCE 
Professionals must possess specific skills to effectively execute 
the various phases of the intelligence process. They obtain these 
abilities from inherent traits, coursework, professional experience, 
and mentors. Building upon one another, these four modes provide 
the array of competencies which successful practitioners need. 
Therefore, educators must appreciate the importance of these modes 
rather than adopting the simplistic concept that educational programs 
can serve as the exclusive means for gaining expertise. The following 
list of competencies was derived from personal experience, the 
literature (Fuld, 1985; Fuld, 1988; McGonagle & Vella, 1990), as well 
as from practicing professionals. Note that teaching experience or 
mentoring often enhances some abilities that were acquired in a 
preceding mode. 
Traits: creativity, persistence, written and oral communication 
skills, analytical ability, understanding of scientific methodology, 
independent learning skills, and business savvy; 
Teachable Skills: strategic thinking, business terminology, market 
research and presentation skills, knowledge of primary information 
sources and research methods, enhancement of journalistic 
interviewing and communication skills, analytical ability, and an 
appreciation of scientific methodology; 
Professional Exgerience: knowledge of corporate power structures 
and decision making processes, industry knowledge, enhancement 
of primary research skills, business savvy, and journalistic 
interviewing and observational skills; 
Mentoring: creativity, persistence, strategic thinking, and business 
terminology, enhancement of communication skills and research 
skills. 
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Recalling the previous discussion regarding the collection, 
analysis, and communication phases of the intelligence process, the 
need for this array of skills and abilities becomes more apparent. 
Having the capabilities to frame research issues, to execute the 
appropriate techniques, as well as to analyze the data and 
communicate their findings requires potential practitioners to fully 
develop their expertise. Professionals may attain some competencies 
within a different mode; that is, lacking a specific trait, an aspirant 
may obtain a skill within a formal educational setting. However, 
being deficient in any one of these competencies within the actual 
work environment can prove detrimental. For example, those who 
can conduct the research but cannot communicate effectively may 
not sustain a career. Apportioning the intelligence process among 
group members may obscure such deficiencies awhile; however, today’s 
right-sized business executives have become less tolerant of ill-
equipped professionals and prefer to retain those with a broad set 
of skills. Therefore, potential practitioners, employers as well as 
educators, must recognize how the skills drawn from inherent traits, 
teachable skills, experience, and mentoring converge into the 
composite of required competencies. Minimizing the importance of 
any one of these four modes can jeopardize the firm, the professional, 
and the educational institution. That is, the firm may not obtain 
the necessary skills to perform the intelligence function properly; 
the professional may not secure a successful career; and the educational 
institution may neither attract qualified students nor develop 
competent professionals. 
To acquire these skills, some professionals may find the trait- 
coursework-experience-men toring sequence inappropriate. That is, 
practicing intelligence workers may only need to complete a few 
courses that update, or expand, their skills. In others cases, those 
with the appropriate traits and extensive business experience may 
already hold an entry-level intelligence position and, therefore, may 
need to complete a more comprehensive set of courses. However, those 
candidates with a limited business background as well as with few 
inherent traits could find that, even after having completed a full 
range of courses, they are unable to secure a job in the field. In 
short, completing coursework is insufficient preparation for a career 
as an intelligence professional. Therefore, although the sequence may 
vary, successful candidates draw their expertise from all four modes. 
Although few dispute the value of traits and mentoring as modes 
for imparting important skills and insights, the literature contains 
considerable discussion regarding the respective role that work 
experience and formal education plays in the development of pro- 
fessional competencies. Highly skilled positions in the new economy 
260 LIBRARY TRENDSIFALL 1994 
demand the appropriate attitudes and technical skills which education 
and job experience provide (Richman, 1994). The relationships 
between experience and education are firmly established in 
professions such as law, medicine, teaching, the ministry, and social 
work, which require candidates to complete an internship component 
before receiving their degree. The changes brought on by the global 
economy are forcing other professional schools, where the experience- 
education partnership has not been firmly entrenched, to reshape 
their curriculum and to develop cooperative agreements in the 
workplace. For example, over the past few years, corporate America 
has criticized business schools for failing to prepare students to 
function in business. These executives demand that schools evaluate 
potential students by the quality of their work experience as well 
as their ability to manage (Blum, 1991; Stonham, 1992). Responding 
to the pressure, the tradition-bound Harvard business school will 
revamp its curriculum and incorporate more practical components 
throughout the program (Bongiorno, 1993). 
Accounting programs have also been criticized recently for failing 
to teach what accounting practitioners actually do. Prodded by the 
American Accounting Association and the American Institute of 
Certified Public Accountants, schools are establishing internships 
and related cooperative programs which benefit both students and 
employers (McCombs & VanSyckle, 1994). Likewise, a growing 
number of engineering programs are complementing theory with 
hands-on experience after practitioners leveled accusations of not 
preparing students to meet current and future challenges. At the 
University of Minnesota, Stanford, and MIT, for example, students 
are collaborating on design projects with companies. These programs 
enable the students to define customer needs, to work in project teams, 
and to manage project time effectively (Durfee, 1994). 
Finally, the Society for Technical Communication’s (STC) board 
of directors urged academics to prepare students for the actual work 
that industry needs them to perform (Hayhoe et al., 1994). Because 
theory cannot be studied in isolation from practical applications, 
they recommended that students be required to participate in an 
internship, practicum, or co-op program which can both sharpen 
their focus on the functions that they will perform and teach them 
aspects of the profession which they cannot learn in the classroom. 
Therefore, the place of work experience within the context of 
professional education is gaining considerable importance. Learning 
from these examples, similar industry-education collaboratives are 
appropriate modes for providing the experience-related competencies 
for intelligence professionals. 
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FACTORSAFFECTINGTHE DEVELOPMENT 
OF FORMALEDUCATIONALPROGRAMS 
To repeat the earlier mentioned definition, the intelligence 
function comprises the collection, analysis, and dissemination of 
information to decision makers and/or strategists about events in 
a company’s external environment. To perform this function 
effectively, successful professionals acquire the necessary skills from 
inherent traits, coursework, work experience, and mentoring. Their 
efforts prove highly beneficial for many firms. As Kelly (1993) 
indicated, the average return on investment (ROI) for intelligence 
projects within a wide range of corporations was 310 percent. 
Furthermore, as American businesses increase their participation in 
the international marketplace, success and survival hinges on good 
intelligence activity (Herring, 1994). Whether a firm is protecting 
its corporate secrets or detecting those of competitors, intelligence 
work is critical, particularly for firms operating within a highly 
volatile industry, such as electronics (Parker, 1994; Kokubo, 1993). 
If intelligence activity means success and survival, and if an elaborate 
array of skills, including those acquired from coursework, are essential 
to perform this function effectively, why do American universities 
virtually ignore this profession? 
An appropriate starting point in response to this question stems 
from the status of intelligence work as a profession. As Abbott (1988) 
indicated, professions emerge from the coalescence of contingent 
forces, including social and cultural recognition of the work or 
activity, professional associations, dominance of related disciplines, 
as well as the establishment of educational programs, standards, codes 
of ethics, and designated journals. However, these factors do not follow 
a clear causal pattern; rather, as Abbott’s system model suggests, 
professions emerge from the interaction of larger forces, such as com- 
petitors and internal structures. Therefore, analyzing the evolution 
of some other profession may not reveal the causes for the sluggish 
emergence of educational programs for intelligence workers. However, 
appreciating the interaction of these factors can offer some beneficial 
insights. The following discussion examines the interplay and prom- 
inence of the contingent forces that influence the evolution of the 
intelligence profession and its formal educational programs. 
Social change transforms professions by creating, increasing, or 
decreasing the need for certain professional activities (Abbott, 1988, 
pp. 143-76). The expansion of corporate America during this century 
increased the need for many specialized professionals. The need to 
verify charges, debts, and fees gained greater prominence, thereby 
prompting the rise of public accountants. The need to create desire 
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for products or services encouraged the growth of advertising agencies. 
The need to refine their production and service delivery processes 
stimulated the exponential growth of technology and, in turn, the 
engineering profession. Technological advances in mass media, 
accompanied by population shifts, transformed aspects of journalism 
and the performing arts. Among the many social changes of today, 
American firms are increasing their exploitation of opportunities in 
the global-marketplace as well as their protection of corporate secrets 
from foreign intruders. The internationalization of the American 
economy heightens the importance of collaboration and cooperation 
on a global scale as well as diminishing the plausibility of economic 
isolation. Accompanying this change is the growing need for 
information about events in the global business environment as well 
as the critical analysis of how the emerging opportunities and threats 
could affect American firms. Despite this rising need, only 3 percent 
of American corporations have established competitor intelligence 
teams (Martin & Stedman, 1991). 
Cultural change also transforms professions (Abbott, 1988, pp. 
177-211). Because culture legitimizes the function and results of 
professional work, changes in social values reprioritize the importance 
and dignity given to certain activities. That is, shifts in cultural values 
greatly influence society’s perception of, and demand for, professional 
work. For example, when a culture values physical and psychological 
well-being as well as justice, doctors, psychologists, lawyers, and their 
related schools, flourish or at least maintain their status. When 
Americans raised their esteem for efficiency and effectiveness, 
engineers and technologists, as well as the followers of the father 
of scientific management, Frederick W. Taylor, gained prominence, 
as did their respective schools. Even though these machines and 
methods relegated workers to inhuman conditions, the culture 
regarded the ultimate outcomes of corporate profits and global 
prestige, which these technological advances enabled, more valuable 
than their crippling effects on the work force (Hitch & Miller, 1994). 
Therefore, even though a professional activity includes certain 
undesirable functions, society tolerates the associated sacrifices and 
bestows dignity upon such work if it enables the attainment of a 
higher value. To maintain justice and national security, as well as 
to conduct war effectively, the government trains intelligence and 
security personnel at the Defense Intelligence Agency’s Joint Military 
Intelligence College and at the Department of Defense Security 
Institute. Despite its covert activities, society supports government 
intelligence to preserve peace and order. The culture tolerates the 
ignoble aspects of government intelligence work because it enables 
the attainment of peace. 
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Society does not, however, endorse business intelligence, because 
many Americans, including those within business, only perceive its 
cloak-and-dagger aspects. This prevents an appreciation of the need 
for maintaining competitive advantage as well as for protecting 
technology and trade secrets. This lack of support does not infer 
that society does not value its technology and trade secrets; rather, 
society does not recognize the benefits associated with the intelligence 
function. In addition, society cannot admit that American and foreign 
businesses engage in competitive and covert activities (Deighen, 1993). 
Hiding behind a pretense of noble conduct is counterproductive for 
the economy, corporations, and investors. Experts have estimated that 
U.S. firms lose $20 to $30 billion per year due to foreign and domestic 
corporate and industrial espionage (Deighen, 1993). The most 
frequently confirmed reports regarding corporate spying against U.S. 
firms involve Argentina, France, Japan, Germany, and the United 
Kingdom; accusations have also been directed at an additional forty 
nations (Herring & DeGenaro, 1994). 
Due to the social stigma associated with business intelligence, 
management attempts to conceal its intelligence efforts. Within the 
first six months of this year, the national and trade press reported 
on firms within the aerospace, pharmaceutical, automotive, tobacco, 
cable television, telephone, and personal health care products 
industries that conducted industrial espionage. Inevitably, additional 
cases were left unreported. The surprising fact is not that U.S. 
corporations conduct intelligence operations, but that they pretend 
these activities are unknown to Americans. Corporations cannot 
disclose the details of these operations; however, these thinly-veiled 
cover-up efforts are also counterproductive and mask the associated 
benefits. Undoubtedly, upon learning that firms conduct business 
intelligence, whether ethical or covert, certain investors may withdraw 
their support, and some customers may boycott products or services. 
Corporations must find ways to legitimize the value of the intelligence 
function within the American culture, otherwise they will continue 
to expend resources needlessly. 
A third factor that affects the evolution of professions in general 
and the intelligence profession in particular is the dominance of 
academic disciplines over their respective knowledge bases. As Abbott 
(1988, pp. 196-21 1) indicates, universities influence the professions 
in various ways. They can maintain the scholarly foundations of 
professional expertise. They can promote the development of the 
knowledge base by testing hypotheses. They can train upcoming 
professionals. They can foster interprofessional competition by 
monopolizing the instruction of students in specific courses. For 
example, in the 1930s, a fight ensued between lawyers and accountants 
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in practices and on campuses as to who had the authority to teach 
accounting principles to law students and commercial law to business 
students. Within professions, needs emerge that require practitioners 
to acquire knowledge from related disciplines. However, such changes 
in the professional functions can undermine the knowledge base of 
various disciplines. Therefore, i t  is not surprising that the positioning 
of coursework for the intelligence profession poses a problem for 
universities. The varied skill set for intelligence professionals is 
derived from the established disciplines of journalism, com-
munications, information science, business administration, and 
statistics. Which discipline is prepared to relinquish control of its 
knowledge base, as well as its head count, to another department 
or school for the training of intelligence professionals? 
A fourth factor that influences the development of a profession 
is the establishment of associations. These professional groups serve 
many functions. They claim jurisdiction over specific expertise. They 
control the activities of practitioners by establishing professional 
standards, certified courses, examinations, licenses, and a code of 
ethics. And finally, they serve to inform practitioners by publishing 
journals and newsletters as well as by convening meetings and 
conferences. These functions were formalized with the establishment 
of the Society of Competitive Intelligence Professionals (SCIP) in 
1986, whose membership currently includes over 2,500 practitioners 
and academics. The society has issued its code of ethics, has published 
its own journal since 1986, and has convened nine national 
conferences. The present officers and directors are exploring various 
alternatives regarding the educational components of the profession. 
As with most professions, however, the formation of a professional 
group alone does not ensure jurisdiction over expertise. Rather, the 
interplay of social and cultural factors as well as the monopolization 
of the knowledge base by academics, together with the establishment 
of professional groups, promote the evolution of a profession. 
Therefore, examining how these factors interact offers insights 
regarding the lack of formal educational programs for the intelligence 
profession. 
Society and its businesses have yet to fully embrace the 
internationalization of the American economy. The hope of regaining 
global dominance in the marketplace, which America held for many 
years after World War 11, still permeates society (Martin & Stedman, 
1991). Focusing upon tactics to regain dominance shifts the attention 
away from sharing and using information effectively (Maglitta, 1994). 
Therefore, the need to gather, analyze, and evaluate information about 
activities in the business environment is minimally recognized 
(Martin & Stedman, 1991). Reflecting this position, the curriculums of 
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professional schools, particularly those within the business discipline, 
place a low priority on the intelligence function. Certainly, their 
course offerings emphasize the management of information systems, 
but within the broader goal of training potential directors and CEOs. 
Consequently, the practice of accessing, analyzing, and evaluating 
competitive information is looked upon as a clerical function and 
of little concern to corporate administrators. Furthermore, mirroring 
the cultural disdain of the function, if the curriculum incorporates 
the topic of business intelligence, it is covered within a few sessions 
of a market research course or a continuing education workshop. 
Rather than jeopardize their reputation in today’s unstable higher 
education market, prominent business schools prefer to demonstrate 
their sensitivity to business trends by introducing environmental 
management courses (Pham, 1994). Therefore, these professional 
programs reflect how management practitioners and the American 
culture regard the practice of competitive intelligence. 
Despite the effect which these social and cultural factors have 
had upon the development of a formal educational component, 
academic journals within various disciplines and the popular business 
press contain a large body of literature devoted to many aspects of 
the intelligence function. Recognizing the importance and value of 
this function, these academics continue their attempt to establish 
a credible program within their respective schools. In addition, the 
practitioners remind strategists, market researchers, and executives 
within their respective firms of the benefits associated with this 
activity. The momentum behind these efforts, as well as the cumulative 
effect of the internationalization of the American economy, will spur 
the adoption of the following recommendations. 
RECOMMENDATIONS 
The establishment of formal educational programs does not, in 
itself, further the development of a profession. Rather, the contingent 
factors which affect the evolution of professions also influence the 
development of a credible educational program. When society needs 
and values a specific professional activity, a formal educational 
program interacts with these forces for support, legitimacy, and 
justification. If, however, a curriculum is instituted to train 
professionals in an activity which society marginally needs or values, 
that program, and its students, will founder. Therefore, those 
advocating these educational changes would be wise to, first, analyze 
their external environment-that is, determine the status of these 
contingent factors. Based upon this evaluation, they can raise the 
level of appreciation for the importance and significance of the 
intelligence function and the potential graduates. 
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Advocates can continue their expansion of the support base by 
demonstrating the relevance of intelligence activities to organizations 
regardless of their purpose. Presently, competitive intelligence is a 
function associated, almost exclusively, with for-profit organizations. 
However, profit as well as not-for-profit settings can, and do, benefit 
from acquiring information about their external environment. 
Therefore, illustrating its applicability to a wider array of 
organizational settings can, in turn, heighten the perceived need for 
this function as well as demonstrate that organizations procure such 
information for reasons other than increasing profits. 
Advocates can further influence how managers value intelligence 
activities by providing them with evidence indicating the extent to 
which foreign competitors do not, in fact, play by the rules (Deighen, 
1993; Herring & DeGenaro, 1994). Raising their awareness of these 
activities can motivate them to adopt proactive counterintelligence 
procedures which would protect valuable intellectual property. 
Taking a proactive stance can also elevate intelligence activities’ 
importance and status to a valuable corporate function. In turn, these 
administrators can speak to their stockholders and stakeholders of 
the positive aspects of business intelligence to offset any initial 
decrease in support which may accompany the adoption of 
counterintelligence activities. Therefore, a proactive corporate posture 
regarding intelligence work can raise its importance and dignity as 
a legitimate function and profession. 
These outreach efforts not only benefit managers and their 
organizations, but also the support base upon which the staff, faculty, 
and students must rely for funding, research and internship sites, 
as well as job placements. Therefore, the importance of these various 
benefits require proponents to collaborate with an extensive array 
of organizations and professional associations. In addition to the 
Society of Competitive Intelligence Professionals, other groups might 
include those from market research, strategy and policy development, 
communications management, journalism, as well as specific industry 
segments which may be most receptive to intelligence activities, such 
as biotechnology, financial services, and telecommunications. These 
contacts may prompt the emergence of opportunities for both the 
organization as well as for staff, faculty, and students. 
Due to the widespread ignorance and dim regard for intelligence 
work among Americans and U.S. corporations, programs should 
initially be established at highly visible and credible institutions. 
With their distinguished faculty and exceptional professional schools, 
prominent schools will attract the caliber of students which this 
profession requires. Furthermore, their introduction of these pro- 
grams will increase the perceived value of the intelligence profession, 
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which is a critical factor at this point in its evolution. Mounting 
programs at unrenowned institutions during this initial stage will 
be detrimental, regardless of the excellence of their curriculum. They 
will find it difficult to develop collaborative arrangements within 
prominent organizations and to attract qualified students. Ultimately, 
such programs could diminish the already dim view of this profession. 
Recall that professionals acquire their expertise from inherent 
traits, coursework, professional experience, and mentors. Therefore, 
quality programs exhibit these various modes not only by offering 
a comprehensive curriculum, but also by attracting qualified students 
and providing enriching internship experiences. Students who can 
analyze problems creatively, teach themselves new skills, and 
communicate effectively, can capitalize upon the strengths of the 
curriculum. Building upon this foundation, the internship phase 
enhances students’ skills and insights as well as providing beneficial 
services to clients. Because students may choose to build upon previous 
coursework or job experience within a specific discipline, program 
directors must establish collaborative relationships with mentors from 
organizations in various industries. In addition, assembling a wide 
variety of settings demonstrates the applicability across industries. 
Dismissing the importance of attracting qualified students, as well 
as not providing an internship component, threatens the mar-
ketability of the graduates and the program. 
A comprehensive curriculum comprises courses of instruction 
including strategy development, market research, primary research 
methods, statistics, information sources, as well as interviewing and 
communication techniques. These topics draw upon the knowledge 
base of multiple disciplines, including information science, business 
administration, statistics, communication, and journalism. Therefore, 
the placement of a program within any one of these disciplines would 
alter the focus of the intelligence function and the profession. That 
is, depending upon its placement, the public would associate intelli- 
gence work with the traditional knowledge base of only one of the 
disciplines, thereby obscuring the hybrid nature of this function. 
Certainly, the curriculum within schools of business administration 
already includes many of these courses. Their directors and faculties 
have established many collaborative arrangements with prominent 
organizations and related professional groups. However, although 
their valuable experience and contacts would satisfy the recommended 
components of an intelligence program, the social stigma associated 
with intelligence activities prevents these schools from initiating such 
programs. In addition, initiating programs within business schools 
could imply that only profit organizations need the services of intelli- 
gence professionals, which, as previously mentioned, misrepresents 
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the applicability of this function. Schools within these other 
disciplines could recognize similarities between the content of their 
curriculum and aspects of the intelligence function. However, rather 
than acquire the necessary internal and external resources, and driven 
by decreasing revenues and increasing operating costs, advocates 
within these schools could choose to contort the desired range of 
competencies to conform to their current curriculum. Furthermore, 
they could rationalize that those components, left unsatisfied, are 
nonessential. Such actions would jeopardize the school, the 
intelligence profession, and, most importantly, the students. 
A reasonable alternative is to initiate an Institute of Strategic 
Intelligence at prominent colleges and universities. This suggestion 
may circumvent many of the problems previously mentioned: (1) Using 
strategic intelligence in the title emphasizes its relationship to strategy 
formulation and decision making, which, ideally, are basic to successful 
organizations. The negative connotations are, therefore, minimized. 
(2) With sufficient outside funding, institutes can often be established 
rather quickly. Most importantly, though, being independent of other 
disciplines, the analysis, evaluation, and dissemination of information 
to decision makers remains the primary focus. However, although 
independent, the administrators would establish consortia with other 
departments and schools whereby graduate and undergraduate students 
could become proficient in the skills necessary to function as 
intelligence professionals in their primary discipline. (3)Independence 
would also permit the administrators to establish collaborative 
arrangements with organizations from a wide variety of industries 
and specialties to serve as internship sites. (4)Having established this 
beachhead, administrators could explore the feasibility of becoming 
a degree-granting institution. If this step appears surmountable, an 
appropriate professional association, such as the Society of 
Competitive Intelligence Professionals, might consider functioning 
as the accrediting body, Therefore, this alternative could preserve the 
integrity of the intelligence profession as well as ensure the suitable 
training of practitioners at prominent colleges and universities. 
CONCLUSION 
The internationalization of the American economy continues 
to cause dramatic changes throughout society. I n  addition, 
telecommunication technologies enable the swift transfer of infor- 
mation and shorten the decision-making processes. These economic 
and technological changes prompt the expansion and contraction of 
industries as well as the emergence and disappearance of professions. 
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However, the evolution of professions is not rapid but results from 
the interaction of social, cultural, and institutional factors. When 
societal needs and cultural values coalesce, an environment is spawned 
which supports the growth of professional educational programs. 
Institutions respond by offering appropriate programs that prepare 
qualified professionals. Might not the current economic, tech-
nological, social, and cultural changes be creating such an atmosphere 
for intelligence programs? If so, the distinctive nature of the 
intelligence profession requires its formal educational programs to 
be established within hybrid environments. 
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